The Effect of Payoff Tables on Experimental Oligopoly Behavior by Gürerk, Özgür & Selten, Reinhard
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Effect of Payoff Tables on
Experimental Oligopoly Behavior
O¨zgu¨r Gu¨rerk and Reinhard Selten
University of Erfurt, CEREB
29. April 2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22489/
MPRA Paper No. 22489, posted 5. May 2010 13:34 UTC
The Eﬀect of Payoﬀ Tables on Experimental
Oligopoly Behavior
Özgür Gürerka Reinhard Seltenb
April 2010
a University of Erfurt / CEREB, Nordhäuser Straße 63, 99089 Erfurt, Germany
b University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-42, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Abstract:
We explore the eﬀects of the provision of an information-processing instrument -
payoﬀ tables - on behavior in experimental oligopolies. In one experimental set-
ting, subjects have access to payoﬀ tables whereas in the other setting they have
not. It turns out that this minor variation in presentation has non-negligible
eﬀects on participants' behavior, particularly in the initial phase of the exper-
iment. In the presence of payoﬀ tables, subjects tend to be more cooperative.
As a consequence, collusive behavior is more likely and quickly to occur.
Keywords: Collusion; Cournot oligopoly; payoﬀ tables; bounded rationality;
framing; presentation eﬀect
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1 Introduction
Payoﬀ tables1 are widely used as an informational aid in experimental research
in economics since its beginnings, especially in market experiments. Some of the
pioneering experimental studies on oligopolies use payoﬀ tables (e.g., Fouraker
and Siegel 1963; Sauermann and Selten 1967; Dolbear et al. 1968) as well as
recent ones (e.g., the majority of the reviewed experimental oligopoly studies
in Huck et al. 2004 or Abbink and Brandts 2008). The inﬂuence of this device
1A payoﬀ table is a matrix that depicts the payoﬀ of player i for all possible combinations
of i's and the opponent's actions. For example, in a Cournot market, the payoﬀ table displays
player i payoﬀ is for all combinations of i 's production choice and the competitors' total
production.
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on subjects' behavior, however, has not yet been explored systematically. With
this study, we try to ﬁll this gap.
If humans were perfectly rational as assumed in standard economic the-
ory, one would not expect to observe any signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the
outcomes of experiments conducted with diﬀerent information processing in-
struments. A cognitively perfect player is able to identify strategies and their
payoﬀ consequences, whether the information on the payoﬀ structure is given
as a mathematical formula or the equivalent information is listed in a payoﬀ ta-
ble. In reality, however, humans cognitive abilities are imperfect; their decision
making process is subject to bounded rationality (Simon 1957). One of the ob-
served eﬀects of boundedly rational behavior is subjects' response to seemingly
irrelevant diﬀerences in the presentation of experimental instructions. Numer-
ous studies report such presentation eﬀects. Pruitt (1967), for instance, reports
more cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game if the payoﬀ structure of the
game is presented to subjects in the decomposed form. In a duopoly experiment,
Selten and Berg (1970) vary the amount of the starting capital by simultane-
ous reduction of within game proﬁt. On contrary to the theoretical prediction,
this variation does change subjects' behavior. More recently, Bosch-Domènech
and Vriend (2003) investigate imitation behavior in Cournot markets with two
and three competitors by varying the presentation of market information. They
ﬁnd that the frequency of imitation do not increase when the information re-
trieval gets more complex. In a gift-exchange experiment, Charness et al. (2004)
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant reduction in both wages and worker eﬀort when subjects are
provided with payoﬀ tables compared to the baseline treatment without pay-
oﬀ tables. Goerg and Walkowitz (2008) report that presentation eﬀects may
inﬂuence behavior in cross-cultural experiments in diﬀerent ways. A positive
framing may result in more cooperative behavior in one society while in the
other it may have no inﬂuence.
It is important to distinguish between presentation eﬀects and other framing
eﬀects. Presentation eﬀects describe the change in subjects responses' to a de-
cision task which is altered slightly though the underlying decision task remains
the same. In contrast to pure presentation eﬀects, valence framing eﬀects occur
due to the presentation of the decision situation in a positive or negative light
(Levin et al. 1998). One of the most prominent examples of the valence fram-
ing eﬀect was reported by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) on the choice reversal
(Asian disease problem). In the economic literature, framing eﬀects are mostly
shown in public good settings (see e.g., Andreoni 1995; Cookson 2000; Brandts
and Schwieren 2009). Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2006) provide a detailed
discussion of diﬀerent framing eﬀects.
In this study, we focus on the pure presentation eﬀect and conduct a series of
Cournot market experiments with two presentational settings that diﬀer slightly.
In one setting named TAB, subjects are provided with payoﬀ tables whereas
they are not in the other setting (noTAB). Our main research interest concerns
whether subjects in the two settings behave diﬀerently. In the context of an
oligopoly, we may re-formulate our research question: Do competitors with an
information processing aid tend to be more collusive than competitors without
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such an aid?
The payoﬀ table we use in our study (see Appendix) reduces the complexity
of the payoﬀ structure by presenting all possible payoﬀs in a crystal clear way.
This clarity may help subjects to realize better what alternatives they have
and what the consequences of these alternatives are. In particular, subjects
may identify collusive quantities more easily. Hence, we conjecture that payoﬀ
tables should lead to more collusive behavior and to higher proﬁts.
Our study includes a complementary research question: What is the eﬀect
of the market size in our context? To investigate possible number eﬀects we
conduct experiments with two, three and four competitors. Previous studies
with quantity setting oligopolies show that competition tend to increase when
the number of competitors grow. Siegel and Fouraker (1963) observe more
competition in the triopoly settings compared to the duopoly markets.2 Huck
et al. (2004) provide a comprehensive discussion of number eﬀects in quantity
setting oligopolies.
Our results show for all market sizes, average total quantities are lower
when subjects are provided with payoﬀ tables, i.e., in TAB, the markets are
more collusive. In the initial phase of the experiment, the diﬀerences between
both settings are most pronounced. Subjects provided with payoﬀ tables choose
more often collusive quantities, which leads to higher prices and proﬁts TAB.
Over time the diﬀerences between both settings get smaller. In both settings,
competition increases when the market size grows. We observe, however, some
tendency to collude even in markets with four competitors.
The next section presents the model. Section 3 describes the experimental
design and procedure. Section 4 is dedicated to the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Since we focus on the impact of payoﬀ tables we use a very simple Cournot
model. In a Cournot oligopoly, N symmetric ﬁrms compete in a market where
a homogenous good is sold. By xi we denote the single quantity produced by
the ﬁrm i (production is limited to 60 units per period). The total market
production, i.e., the sum of xi is represented by X. To simplify the problem
without changing its nature we set the cost of production to zero. Furthermore,
we assume a linear market demand where the computer buys the total pro-
duction. The resulting price is denoted with p and the inverse demand function
then is p = max {60−X, 0}. The ﬁrms decide simultaneously on xi. The proﬁt
of ﬁrm i is given by pii = (60−X)xi for X ≤ 60 and pii = 0 for X > 60.
For each market size, one can easily calculate the Cournot-equilibrium, which
is the only pure Nash-equilibrium of the stage game and yields positive proﬁts
for each player. We refer to this equilibrium as the Cournot-Nash-equilibrium
(henceforth CNE).3 The CNE is the ﬁrst theoretical benchmark to which we
2Dolbear et al. (1968) ﬁnd similar results in a price-setting experiment.
3The stage game also has other pure equilibria, e.g., xi = 60 for i = 1...n.
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Table 1: Total quantity and prices at benchmark outcomes
Collusion CNE Competition
Market size X p X p X p
N = 2 30 30 30 20 60 0
N = 3 30 30 45 15 60 0
N = 4 30 30 48 12 60 0
will compare the experimental results. The second benchmark to which we re-
fer is collusion where all competitors act as if they were a single monopolist to
maximize their joint proﬁts. The third benchmark is the competitive outcome
where ﬁrms maximize their proﬁts given the market clearing price. Many ex-
perimental studies refer to these three benchmarks of quantity-setting oligopoly
(see e.g., Oﬀerman et al. 2002). Table 1 depicts the total quantities and prices
in markets with two, three, and four competitors for the respective benchmarks.
3 Experimental design
Our experimental design contains two informational settings (noTAB, TAB) and
three market sizes (two, three and four competitors), i.e., we have six experi-
mental treatments. We conducted 10 independent observations per treatment;
in total 180 students participated at nine experimental sessions. After the par-
ticipants had entered the laboratory, the instructor read aloud the instructions4
to be sure that every participant heard the information at least once. The sub-
jects' assignment to diﬀerent markets was random but ﬁxed for the duration of
the experiment. Communication was not allowed. A market period consisted
of a decision and a feedback phase. After the subjects made their quantity de-
cisions, all competitors received feedback about all single quantities and proﬁts
in their market. The participants played 100 experimental periods that lasted
two and half hours on average including the introduction. The average payoﬀ
was about 18 Euros. The experiments were programmed with the experimental
programming toolbox RatImage (Abbink and Sadrieh 1995).
4 Results
4.1 The Initial Eﬀect of Payoﬀ Tables
Result 1 In the initial phase of the experiment, subjects with payoﬀ tables
choose more often collusive quantities than subjects without payoﬀ tables.
Already in the ﬁrst period, subjects with payoﬀ tables choose more often
quantities that are closer to the collusive benchmark than to other benchmarks.
4For an English translation of the instructions, see the Appendix. The original instructions
in German are available upon request from the authors.
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Figure 1: Average numbers in diﬀerent phases
In TAB, on average, the absolute distance between a subject's quantity and the
collusive benchmark is signiﬁcantly smaller than in noTAB (Mann-Whitney U-
Test, p = 0.082). Obviously, many subjects in TAB were able to immediately
identify the joint proﬁt maximizing (symmetric) quantity. In TAB, the initial
collusive tendency continues in the consecutive periods. Averaged over the ﬁrst
ﬁve periods and aggregated over all market sizes, subjects in TAB choose signif-
icantly more often (U-Test, p = 0.004) collusive quantities (49% of all decisions)
than subjects in noTAB (29% of all decisions).
Does the initial eﬀect of payoﬀ tables on subjects' quantity choices last in
the course of the experiment or is it just a straw ﬁre? In the following section,
we tackle this question by looking at the aggregate numbers averaged over the
whole experimental horizon.
4.2 Overall Total Quantities and Prices
Figure 1 displays average total quantities (panels a-c), market prices (panels d-
f), and average total proﬁts (panels g-h), for diﬀerent market sizes. To study the
diﬀerences over time, we divide the experimental time horizon in three phases
each averaging the results of 30 periods. We consider an ending phase of 10
periods separately to exclude possible end game eﬀects.
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Result 2 For all market sizes and in all phases, average total quantities are
lower in TAB than in noTAB. With one exception, average prices are higher in
TAB than in noTAB.
On the aggregate level, there is a clear diﬀerence in behavior between sub-
jects using payoﬀ tables and those who do not have access to it. As can be seen
in Figure 1, in all phases and for all market sizes, the average total quantity is
lower in TAB than in noTAB. In addition, average prices are also higher in TAB
than in noTAB in almost all phases and market sizes. The only exception where
this is not the case is phase 2 (periods 31-60) of the quadropolies. As a conse-
quence, average total (market) proﬁts are also higher in TAB than in noTAB,
in all phases and market sizes with the exception of phase 2 of quadropolies.
Hence, the immediate strong eﬀect of payoﬀ tables observed in the beginning
phase was indeed not a straw ﬁre.
4.3 The Eﬀect of the Market Size
What is the impact of the market size on average quantities and prices? The
Cournot model predicts the increase of total output and the reduction of prices
when the number of competitors grows.
Result 3 In both settings, quantities (prices) decrease (increase) signiﬁcantly
when market size grows.
Averaged over 100 periods, Jonckheere-Terpstra-Tests result in highly sig-
niﬁcant p-values showing that the larger the market size is the higher is the
average total production (noTAB : p = 0.007; TAB : p = 0.000). They also show
that in both settings the prices decrease signiﬁcantly (noTAB : p = 0.007; TAB :
p = 0.001) when the market size grows from two to three to four. Hence, our
results conﬁrm the predictions of the Cournot model and are in line with the
experimental ﬁndings of Fouraker and Siegel (1963) and Huck et al. (2004).
In the next section, we investigate whether and how quantities and prices
evolved during the course of the experiment.
4.4 Evolution of Total Quantities and Prices
In order to study the evolution of total quantities and prices we compare quan-
tity averages obtained over periods 1-30 (phase1) to the averages of periods
61-90 (phase 3).
Result 4 In TAB average quantities (prices) of triopolies and quadropolies de-
crease (increase) signiﬁcantly from phase 1 to phase 3 while there is not such
a decrease in noTAB. Average total quantities (prices) in TAB-duopolies start
on a low (high) level and remain low (high) while noTAB-duopolies show a de-
creasing (increasing) trend.
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In noTAB -duopolies, average quantities are signiﬁcantly lower in phase 3
(39.5) than in phase 1 (42.5) (Wilcoxon matched pairs test, p = 0.030). Conse-
quently, prices in noTAB -duopolies are signiﬁcantly higher (p = 0.023) in phase
3 (21.0) than in phase 1 (18.2). In TAB -duopolies, the decrease in quantities
(from 38.7 to 38.2) is not signiﬁcant since subjects with payoﬀ tables - in con-
trast to subjects without payoﬀ tables - choose low production levels already in
the initial phase of the experiment. Analogously, in TAB, the increase in prices
from phase 1 to phase 3 is not signiﬁcant (from 21.8 to 23.0).
In TAB -triopolies, the average total quantity is signiﬁcantly lower (p =
0.053) in phase 3 (44.3) than in phase 1 (50.2). The prices increase signiﬁcantly
from 13.8 to 17.4 (p = 0.053). In noTAB, there is no signiﬁcant change neither
in quantities (from 56.6 to 54.5) nor in prices (from 9.8 to 12.3).
We observe a similar pattern also in markets with four competitors. In TAB,
the quantity in phase 3 is signiﬁcantly lower (p = 0.065) than in phase 1. The
prices increase from 8.9 to 11.4 (p = 0.097). There is, however, no signiﬁcant
decrease of quantities in noTAB. In 6 of 10 markets, quantities decrease while, on
average, quantities increase from 59.6 to 65.1. Prices do not increase signiﬁcantly
(from 8.2 to 10.9).
4.5 The Long-Run Performance of Markets
As the above numbers show, in markets with three and four competitors, we
observe a trend to more collusive quantities when subjects are provided with
payoﬀ tables while we do not observe such a trend in the noTAB setting. In the
next section, we discuss markets' long-run performances by classifying them
according to the markets' average quantities in periods 60-90. Previous studies
use similar classiﬁcations, see e.g., Fouraker and Siegel (1963) or Huck et al.
(2004).
We deﬁne a market as collusive (abbrev. COL) in the long-run if this mar-
ket's average total quantity is closer to the collusive benchmark than to other
two benchmarks introduced in Section 2. This means, a duopoly market is
classiﬁed as collusive if this market's average total quantity is below 35 while
the same market is classiﬁed as a CNE-market (CNE) if this market's aver-
age total quantity lies between 35 and 50. Applying the same logic we label
duopoly markets with average quantities above 50 as competitive (COM). We
deﬁne markets with an average total quantity exceeding 60 by more than 10%
as punishment markets (PUN) since the experimental data reveal that such
high average quantities often occured due to punishment actions taken by one
or more competitors. We will discuss punishment acts in more detail below in
Section 4.6.
Result 5 In the long-run, there are more collusive markets in the TAB setting.
Table 2 depicts the results of the classiﬁcation. We count ﬁve collusive
duopolies in each setting. Four duopolies in TAB achieve even a perfectly
collusive outcome, i.e., the average total quantity in these markets amounts
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Table 2: Classiﬁcation of markets according to the long-run performance (Peri-
ods 61-90)
noTAB TAB
Market size COL CNE COM PUN COL CNE COM PUN
N = 2 5 2 3 0 5 3 2 0
N = 3 2 3 2 3 4 3 3 0
N = 4 1 5 1 3 2 2 5 1
Total 8 10 6 6 11 8 10 1
exactly to the collusive benchmark of 30. In noTAB, only two duopolies achieve
a perfect collusion. There are two collusive triopolies in noTAB, while in TAB
we count four collusive triopolies. In noTAB, only one triopoly achieves a perfect
collusion whereas in TAB two markets are perfectly collusive. We count one
collusive quadropoly in noTAB and two collusive quadropolies in TAB. Hence,
aggregated over all market sizes, there are more collusive markets in TAB (11
markets, 37% of all markets) than in noTAB (8 markets, 27%). Remarkably,
we observe collusive behavior even in quadropolies.
Aggregated over all market sizes, in noTAB, there are ten markets with
average total quantities around the CNE: two duopolies, three triopolies and
ﬁve quadropolies. In TAB, there are eight CNE markets, three duopolies and
triopolies each and two quadropolies. In noTAB, we classify six markets as
competitive while there are 10 COM markets in TAB. Interestingly, there are
six PUN markets in noTAB while there is only one single PUN market in TAB.
Apparently, there is less need for punishment activities in TAB. For TAB, a χ2-
Test rejects the hypothesis that the observed market classiﬁcation is normally
distributed (χ2 = 1.467, p = 0.043) whereas the same hypothesis cannot be
rejected for noTAB (χ2 = 8.133, p = 0.722).
4.6 The Collusiveness of Markets
The above classiﬁcation reveals that many markets succeed to collude. Interest-
ingly, oligopolies in TAB establish the monopoly quantity in signiﬁcantly earlier
periods than markets in noTAB.
Result 6 In TAB, collusion is established signiﬁcantly earlier than in noTAB.
This is true in terms of collusive quantities as well as collusive prices.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the percentage of collusive markets in each
setting, and aggregated over all market sizes. In the beginning phase (periods
1-30), in TAB, there are signiﬁcantly more collusive markets than in noTAB
(p = 0.033). The markets in noTAB catch up during the experiment with
the markets in TAB. Nevertheless, averaged over 100 periods, there are more
collusive markets in TAB than in noTAB (p = 0.099).
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Figure 2: Relative frequency of collusive markets
Alternatively, we can use the price level as a measure to evaluate markets'
collusiveness. We refer to prices above the CNE prices as collusive prices (cf.
Huck et al. 2004). Aggregated over all markets, in the beginning phase (peri-
ods 1-30), there are signiﬁcantly more collusive prices in TAB (35.4%) than in
noTAB (20.4%, U-Test, p = 0.030). In both settings, in the last phase (periods
61-90) the percentages of collusive prices increase: in noTAB to 34.2% and in
TAB to 44.1%. This diﬀerence, however, is not signiﬁcant.
4.7 Individual Behavior
How do payoﬀ tables inﬂuence the individual behavior? Since in our experi-
mental design subjects receive detailed feedback about each of the competitors'
quantities and proﬁts, they were able to apply a variety of (behavioral) strate-
gies. We focus on three strategies to which it is often referred to in previous
studies on quantity setting markets: Best-reply, collusive response, and imita-
tion. In our game, each competitor is able to unilaterally force the market price
to zero by choosing xi = 60. This choice can be interpreted as a punishment
act since in this case the player who chooses 60 as well as all other competi-
tors obtain zero proﬁts for sure. For this reason, we consider punishment as a
fourth behavioral strategy. In the following, we ﬁrst explain these four strategies
more in detail. Then we look whether and how often subjects did choose these
strategies in the experiment.
Best-Reply: A player i playing a (myopic) best-reply strategy assumes that
the sum of competitors' quantities will be the same in period t as in period t−1
and sets her actual quantity in period t according to the best-reply function
xti = 30− (Xt−1−i /2) with Xt−1−i being the sum of other competitors' last period
quantities.
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Collusive Response: A player i who applies the collusive response strategy
wants to maximize the joint proﬁts in the market, i.e., including her own quan-
tity and those of her competitors. Thus she chooses xi according to the formula:
xti = 30−Xt−1−i , i.e., the total quantity including player i's quantity equals the
monopoly quantity.
Imitate the successful: An imitator i sets the own quantity to xti = 30−xt−1j ,
where i being the imitator and j the most successful competitor in the previous
period.
Punishment: A punisher i chooses xi = 60 to set the market price to zero.
Which of the strategies described above subjects follow? Are subjects in
TAB more inclined to apply best-reply strategies than subjects in noTAB since
the payoﬀ table presents them the best-replies in a clear way? Do subjects with
payoﬀ tables choose more often collusive responses which were easily identiﬁ-
able? On the other hand, because of the clarity, one could expect less imitation
behavior with payoﬀ tables. Punishment could be more severe without payoﬀ
tables because of the higher level of quantities.
Result 7 The most frequent strategy subjects apply is collusive response, in both
settings. Followed by imitation and best-reply in similar percentages. Subjects
in noTAB punish more often than subjects in TAB.
Table 3 depicts the relative frequencies we observed in our experiments. The
numbers in parentheses depict the percentage of periods, in which a strategy
was applicable which means that a player indeed was able to choose a particular
strategy. Not all the strategies were applicable in each period. For example, a
collusive response strategy is only applicable if the sum of the quantities in a
market is less than or equal to 30. If the sum of the competitors' quantity is
greater than 30, there is no reasonable collusive response.
Best-reply was applicable in 87.6% of the cases in noTAB and in 92.4%
cases in TAB. In both settings, however, only less than 10% of the decisions are
actually best-replies. This is surprising since the subjects had all necessary infor-
mation to calculate the best-replies. In TAB, subjects could even read the best
reply directly from the payoﬀ table. Despite this, subjects in TAB (8.2%) do
not choose signiﬁcantly more often best-replies than subjects in noTAB (7.1%).
In noTAB, in 47.1% of all cases collusive response was applicable (in TAB :
50.8%). While in noTAB 28.6% of the applicable cases were actually collusive
responses in TAB 37.4% of the decisions were collusive responses. Hence, col-
lusive response is the most frequent observed decision rule in both settings, in
relative as well as in absolute terms. Subjects in TAB choose more often col-
lusive responses than subjects in noTAB. The diﬀerence between both settings
is most greatest for the triopolies. In both settings, the amount of the collusive
responses decline with the market size.
In noTAB, imitation was applicable in 36.9% of all possible cases (37.8%
in TAB), however, it occurs in 10.1% of the these cases (10.9% in TAB). In
duopolies imitation is more frequent (20.0% in noTAB, 16.3% in TAB) whereas
it is rare in quadropolies (8.3% in noTAB, 7.8% in TAB). The discrepancy
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Table 3: Observed decisions in percent of the applicable cases (in parentheses)
noTAB TAB
Market size BR IM CR PUN BR IM CR PUN
N = 2 3.4 20.0 37.8 1.0 8.0 16.3 39.3 1.6
(99.0) (24.2) (93.4) (99.0) (98.4) (24.9) (93.3) (99.0)
N = 3 9.8 8.6 21.6 5.3 6.7 13.2 40.2 2.3
(89.3) (41.5) (37.5) (99.0) (95.4) (36.1) (55.7) (99.0)
N = 4 7.0 8.3 21.1 7.1 9.6 7.8 29.3 4.7
(80.5) (39.7) (30.9) (99.0) (87.2) (45.6) (27.7) (99.0)
Total 7.1 10.1 28.6 5.2 8.2 10.9 37.4 3.2
(87.6) (36.9) (47.1) (99.0) (92.4) (37.8) (50.8) (99.0)
between the imitation numbers in duopolies and in quadropolies could be due
to the ambiguity of the intention of imitational decisions. Imitation must not
necessarily mean to copy the most successful competitor. Sometimes imitation
occurs in order to send a message to another competitor. For example, some
subjects choose the symmetric collusive quantity and that of the competitor
with the highest quantity alternately to signal that the competitor with the
highest quantity also should choose the collusive quantity. It is clear, that this
type of signaling works better if the addressee of the signal can identify that
he or she is the addressee - as in the case of a duopoly.
Punishment was applicable with the exception of the ﬁrst period, i.e., in
99.0% of possible cases. In noTAB, 5.2% of subjects punish while in TAB only
3.2% punish. In both settings, the use of punishment increases with the market
size (Jonckheere-Terpstra-Test, p = 0.026 for noTAB ; p = 0.016 for TAB). This
reﬂects the increasing diﬃculties in collusive behavior when the market size
grows.
5 Conclusion
In this study, we systemically investigate the eﬀect of payoﬀ tables on subjects'
behavior in Cournot markets with two, three, and four competitors. We de-
signed our study to strictly focus on the presentation eﬀect of payoﬀ tables. For
this, the only variation between our two informational settings is the provision
of a payoﬀ table - all other things remaining equal. Hence, any diﬀerences be-
tween the both settings of our study can be unambiguously traced back to the
presence (or the absence) of payoﬀ tables.
Overall results show that subjects provided with payoﬀ tables choose more
often collusive quantities and obtain higher proﬁts. With regard to quantities,
there exist signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the initial phase of the experiment. Sub-
jects with payoﬀ tables manage to collude earlier than subjects without payoﬀ
tables. Towards the end of the experiment, however, the diﬀerences between
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both settings get smaller. Thus, the length of the experiment seems to be an
important determinant: in experiments with a small number of periods, payoﬀ
tables are more likely to make signiﬁcant diﬀerences.
Our results show that payoﬀ tables indeed aﬀect subjects' behavior. In
contrast to Charness et al. (2004), however, we ﬁnd that payoﬀ tables seem to
support cooperative behavior. They observe signiﬁcant reductions of average
wages and eﬀort levels in a gift exchange game when subjects are provided with
payoﬀ tables. One major diﬀerence between the study of Charness et al. (2004)
and ours is that we study a simultaneous decision situation whereas Charness
et al. (2004) study a sequential setting. Thus, the eﬀects of payoﬀ tables seem
to be ambiguous and depend on the game type. Both ours and the study of
Charness et al. (2004) show, however, that payoﬀ tables have an eﬀect on
behavior. Future research may investigate deeper how diﬀerent game types and
the eﬀects of payoﬀ tables are related.
Our complementary research question concerns the eﬀect of the market size.
The evidence from the numerous previous experimental studies on Cournot
oligopolies is the predominance of competitive behavior (see e.g., Holt 1995).
Collusion is rare in markets with more than two competitors (Huck et al. 2004).
We ﬁnd that total quantities increase while prices decrease as the market size
grows. Thus, our results are largely in line with previous studies though we ﬁnd
some tendencies for collusion also with four competitors. For all market sizes,
the number of collusive markets are higher with payoﬀ tables.
In the theoretical literature, we ﬁnd many results on the presence and ab-
sence of information but very little on the signiﬁcance of information processing
instruments. This study clearly shows that information-processing aids have
non-negligible eﬀects. Everything that increases the understanding of the sit-
uation helps increasing the rationality in the decision making process. Payoﬀ
tables do this by unraveling the hidden information in the mathematical for-
mulas. Our results show that this clarity indeed has impact on subjects behavior
even in a simple setting. Hence, payoﬀ tables might have even stronger eﬀects
in more complicated environments which possibly demand subjects' cognitive
abilities even more. Thus, from a methodological point of view, the provision
of payoﬀ tables to the subjects may be useful and recommended, especially in
complex experimental studies.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Translation of the Instructions to the Experiment
The Structure of the Experiment. The experiment consists of 100 periods.
You will be randomly assigned to diﬀerent groups. There are 2 to 4 participants
in each group. The composition of each group does not change throughout the
experiment. The members of a group are competitors on a market for a speciﬁc
good. At the beginning of the experiment you will be informed, how many
competitors you have.
The Structure of a Period. You determine your supply x, by choosing
a number out of {0..60}. There are no costs, i.e., the good is produced and
supplied without costs. Depending on your supply and the supply of your
competitors, the total supply X on this market is determined as follows: X =∑
i xi, where xi denotes the single supply of the supplier i on the market. The
price p depends on the total supply X as follows:
p =
{
60−X if X ≤ 60
0 if X > 60
Your proﬁt G is calculated as follows: G = p · x. Your earnings depend on
your ﬁnal proﬁt.
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Feedback at the end of each Period. At the end of each round, each
participant is informed about his proﬁt G and the supplies and proﬁts of his
competitors. The proﬁts of your competitors are determined in the same way
as your own proﬁt. Depending on the proﬁt, every participant is paid a certain
amount in the ﬁctitious currency Thaler. The screen shows the proﬁt of the
last period and the cumulated proﬁt (sum of all proﬁts obtained so far).
End of the Experiment and Total Payoﬀs. From the beginning, the ex-
change rate is displayed on the computer screen. At the end of the experiment
your cumulated proﬁt will be multiplied with the exchange rate. After the
experiment you will be paid this amount.
Additional instructions for the setting TAB. You will be provided with
a payoﬀ table. The lines on this table correspond to your possible supplies out
of {0..60}. The columns correspond to the competitors' supplies (i.e., sum of
the supplies of your competitors). In the respective ﬁelds of the table, you will
ﬁnd your corresponding proﬁt.
6.2 The Payoﬀ Table
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Figure 3: The Payoﬀ Table
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